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COMMENT
Revenue Ruling 94-38: The Uncertainty
Continues - A Look at Using the Tax
Code to Effectuate Environmental
Remediation
BY PASQUALE SOMMELIA*
I. Introduction
Environmental remediation costs have a significant fi-
nancial impact on both industry and government. It has been
estimated that the costs of complete environmental remedia-
tion could run as high as one trillion dollars.1 Furthermore,
"the tax treatment of these costs may vary the total cost by
more than a third."2 Thus, the tax treatment of environmen-
* The author is a third year law student at Pace University, graduating
in May, 1996. The author wishes to thank Professor Ronald H. Jensen, a pro-
fessor in tax law at Pace University, for his time and effort in reading and pro-
viding valuable critiques at the various stages of this paper. The author also
wishes to thank the members of the Pace Environmental Law Review for their
hard work and dedication. The author dedicates this paper to the members of
his family, especially his parents and his brother, for all their support, espe-
dally throughout law school.
1. J. Andrew Hoerner, Tax Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs:
An Environmental View, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 166-44.
2. Id.
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tal clean-up costs will have a tremendous financial impact on
both the taxpayer and the United States Treasury.
In an attempt to alleviate uncertainty surrounding the
tax treatment of environmental remediation costs, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Ruling 94-38 on
June 3, 1994.3 However, since its issuance, there has been a
question whether Revenue Ruling 94-38 was a step in the
right direction with respect to the tax treatment of environ-
mental clean-up costs, leaving behind the uncertainty created
by Technical Advice Memoranda (TAMs)4, also known as Pri-
vate Letter Rulings, 92-40-004, 93-15-004, and 94-11-002.
However, Revenue Ruling 94-38 did not accomplish this, so
the question remains and the uncertainty lingers.
3. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. Revenue Rulings are the Treasury
Department's "answer to a specific question raised by the taxpayer concerning
his tax liability. In the interest of a uniform application of the tax laws, they
are published to provide precedents for use in the disposition of like cases.
While they do not have the force and effect of regulations, they do at least re-
flect the current policies of the Internal Revenue Service." JAMEs J. FREELAND,
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 26 (8th ed. 1994)[herein-
after FREELAND]. Furthermore, since Revenue Rulings are issued at a higher
level in the IRS and are intended to resolve greater questions and to guide all
IRS employees, more time is spent drafting a Revenue Ruling than a Technical
Advice Memorandum (TAM). Id. at 26. Although the IRS has the power to ret-
roactively revoke a Revenue Ruling, a Revenue Ruling that has not been re-
voked reflects the current policies of the IRS. Id. at 26.
Similar to Revenue Rulings, Treasury Regulations also help explain what a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) actually says. A Treasury Regu-
lation, which is subordinate to the IRC, is a form of guidance that provides
specific examples of the application of the IRC. Id.at 25-27. Treasury Regula-
tions do not discuss environmental cleanup costs; instead, they focus on the
distinction between repairs and replacements in explaining the difference be-
tween current deductions and capital expenditures. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4
(1994).
Although Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings are not statutory
law, they both help explain the intent of the IRC and are likely to provide gui-
dance as to how the IRS will decide a case involving a similar issue. Therefore,
although Revenue Rulings and Treasury Regulations are not statutory law,
they can have the effect of statutory law. FREELAND, supra, at 25-27.
4. A TAM is issued when an IRS Regional or District Office employee or a
taxpayer asks the IRS National Office for advice on a tax question. This ques-
tion relates to some ambiguity in the tax law. I.R.C. § 6110 (1994) (entitled
"Public Inspection of Written Determinations"); See also FREELAND, supra note
3, at 26-27.
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Revenue Ruling 94-38 specifically provides that environ-
mental cleanup costs relating to soil and groundwater
remediation can be currently deductible, rather than capital-
ized and depreciated over the life of the benefit provided by
the expenditure.5 Revenue Ruling 94-38 responded to tax-
payer concerns regarding the treatment of environmental
cleanup costs. However, Revenue Ruling 94-38 ignored con-
cerns regarding the tax treatment of asbestos and pre-
purchase pollution cleanup costs, and it created uncertainty
as to the IRS's position in the case of depreciable property.
6
The IRS should clarify this matter by issuing Revenue Rul-
ings which address asbestos abatement costs, pre-purchase
pollution cleanup costs, 7 and set forth its position on the ap-
plicability of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to depreciable property.8
Although the IRS could issue TAMs to individual taxpay-
ers who request guidance on a particular issue, the IRS may
avoid the time and expense of such issuances by simply ren-
dering another Revenue Ruling on the matter.9 Revenue Rul-
ings give guidance to all IRS employees, and are precedent
5. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
6. See infra Section III, Revenue Ruling 94-38: What does it say and what
does it accomplish?, for a discussion of the facts and reasoning of Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38. Revenue Ruling 94-38 appears to address TAM 93-15-004. How-
ever, it does not address TAMs 92-40-002 and 94-11-002, which address
asbestos abatement costs. This raises the question whether the IRS intends to
apply the logic of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to other TAMs that deal with environ-
mental cleanup costs, such as TAMs 92-40-002 and 94-11-002. Furthermore, in
a recently issued TAM the IRS only partially addresses whether Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38 also applies to pre-purchase pollution and this issue was addressed in
a subsequent TAM. See infra notes 197 and 208.
7. The IRS recently issued TAM 95-41-005 that partially addresses this
matter. See infra notes 197 and 208.
8. Congressional response would be the best course of action, if the desired
result is contrary to existing law. But, if it is merely a matter of interpretation,
the IRS can act because the IRS has been given power to enforce the IRC. The
United States Supreme Court recognized this power in Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Thus, if the IRS makes their position
known, it would be sufficient to resolve some concerns. Prior to Revenue Ruling
94-38, the IRS apparently restricted itself to issuing TAMs as evidenced by
TAMs 92-40-004, 93-15-004, and 94-11-002.
9. TAMs are issued because there is uncertainty on the matter. See supra
note 4. See also FREELAND, supra note 3, at 26-27. If the IRS removes this un-
certainty by issuing some helpful, binding guidance, there is likely to be less of
a need for the IRS to issue TAMs.
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for all taxpayers, while TAMs are binding only on a specific
taxpayer. Therefore, a Revenue Ruling that states the IRS's
position is essential to clarify the law in this area. 10 Upon
reaching this conclusion, it is essential to determine what the
Revenue Ruling should contain. The Ruling's contents can-
not be contrary to existing tax law because only Congress has
the power to change the existing law.
This comment contains five sections. In Section II, this
comment will consider statutory and administrative pro-
nouncements on this issue. It will review Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) §§ 162 and 263. Revenue Ruling 88-5711 and
TAMs 92-40-004,12 93-15-004,13 and 94-11-00214 will also be
reviewed.
Section III considers Revenue Ruling 94-38, focusing pri-
marily on what this Revenue Ruling accomplished. This sec-
tion examines the facts that form the basis of Revenue Ruling
94-38. It also considers the IRS's reasoning in allowing envi-
ronmental cleanup costs that relate to soil and groundwater
remediation to be currently deductible, while providing that
costs incurred to build a new groundwater treatment facility
be capitalized.' 5
Section IV will critique the IRS's position in Revenue
Ruling 94-38 as well as its position in prior TAMs. This sec-
tion will consider (1) whether the IRS's position with respect
to soil and groundwater remediation is correct; (2) whether
10. However, some believe that no immediate guidance is necessary be-
cause "the long-standing principles and authorities of existing [tax] law gov-
erning deductibility and capitalization of expenditures are adequate to deal
with the area of environmental remediation." Frederick L. Webber, CMA Urges
Treasury To Reverse Course On Environmental Remediation Costs, Tax Notes
Today, May 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 105-23.
According to some, it would be sufficient'to suspend TAMs 92-40-004, 93-15-
004, and 94-11-002 because the TAMs "distort these established rules and are
being applied by IRS personnel . . . to require capitalization of expenditures
that are clearly deductible under the regulations and numerous judicial deci-
sions." Id.
11. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
12. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
13. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
14. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
15. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
REVENUE RULING 94-38
Revenue Ruling 94-38 provides adequate guidance to the tax-
payer; and (3) further questions raised by Revenue Ruling
94-38.
Section V concludes that the IRS must issue another
Revenue Ruling that addresses the issues neglected by Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38.
II. The Law Prior to Revenue Ruling 94-38:
Environmental Cleanup Costs - Current
Deductibility or Capitalization
Prior to Revenue Ruling 94-38, there was no specific gui-
dance as to the tax treatment of environmental cleanup costs.
Although the tax law clearly distinguished between currently
deductible and capital expenses, it did not specifically men-
tion environmental cleanup costs. 16 Thus, a taxpayer had to
examine the nature of the expense to determine whether it
was to be classified as a capital expense or a currently deduct-
ible expense.
This determination can have a tremendous impact on a
taxpayer's tax liability. For example, if a taxpayer earns
$10,000,000 in income in a given year and incurs $2,000,000
in environmental cleanup costs, current deductibility would
mean that the taxpayer would pay taxes on only $8,000,000
of income. If the expenses were capitalized and depreciated
over the useful life17 of the benefit provided, ten years, for
example, then only $200,000 would be deductible in the cur-
rent year, meaning that taxes would be paid on $9,800,000 of
income in the current year. Thus, in this example, the tax-
payer would pay taxes on an additional $1,800,000 of income
if the expenses were capitalized rather than currently de-
ducted. Assuming a tax rate of 33%, this taxpayer would pay
an additional $600,000 in taxes in the current year.
16. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994) (entitled "Trade or Business Expenses"); I.R.C.
§ 263 (1994) (entitled "Capital Expenditures"); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994);
Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
17. For purposes of this paper, I am assuming that an asset's useful life is
equal to its class-life for purposes of depreciation. Furthermore, for ease of il-
lustration, I am assuming that depreciation is equal in each year.
1995] 349
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Furthermore, since one dollar today is worth more than
one dollar tomorrow, additional savings exist.18 If a taxpayer
is able to save one dollar today, he saves more than if he
would save one dollar tomorrow. 19 This is because a current
dollar can be invested and earn income.20 Consider, for ex-
ample, that the interest rate is five percent per year. In that
case, one dollar today would be worth $1.05 next year. There-
fore, since money can be invested and earn interest it is evi-
dent that most taxpayers would prefer current deductibility
to reduce their tax burden immediately and to take advan-
tage of the time value of money.21
However, before a taxpayer can treat environmental
costs as currently deductible, the taxpayer must research the
applicable tax law. The tax law may come in many forms.
The IRS issues Revenue Rulings, Technical Advice Memo-
randa, and Treasury Regulations, while Congress promul-
gates the Internal Revenue Code.22
A. The Internal Revenue Code
Presently, the tax law does not favor the taxpayer. Cur-
rent deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and thus the
taxpayer must prove that he is entitled to a current deduc-
18. This concept is known as the time value of money. DAVID S. KIDWELL
AND RICHARD L. PETERSON, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 46-
49 (4th ed. 1990). See also HERBERT B. MAYO, FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 173
(3d ed. 1989).
19. KIDWELL AND PETERSON, supra note 18. See also MAYO, supra note 18.
20. MAYO, supra note 18, at 172.
21. Some taxpayers, however, may prefer to capitalize these expenses and
depreciate them over the useful life of the benefit provided if they do not have
enough income to offset the deduction and expect to incur losses in the future to
the extent that the 3 year carryback and 15 year carryforward provisions for
losses would not be helpful. See I.R.C. § 172(b) (1994) (entitled "Net Operating
Loss Carrybacks and Carryovers"). In that case, the taxpayers would prefer to
prorate the deduction over a period of years. For example, if a taxpayer earns
$1,000,000 in income, but incurs $3,000,000 in environmental cleanup ex-
penses, the taxpayer may prefer to prorate these expenses over a period of at
least three years in order to take full advantage of the deduction for these
expenses.
22. See FREELAND, supra note 3, at 21-27.
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tion.2S To determine deductibility, a taxpayer must look to
the tax law.24 After distinguishing between currently deduct-
ible expenses and capital expenses, and examining the na-
ture of most environmental cleanup costs, these costs must be
classified as either a currently deductible or capital expense.
The overall statutory basis for this classification scheme is
found within the Internal Revenue Code.
The IRC is statutory law which expresses congressional
intent in the area of tax law. Revenue Rulings, Treasury
Regulations, and TAMs, which the IRS issues under a grant
of authority from Congress, merely explain how the IRS en-
forces the law.25 Therefore, an analysis of the distinctions be-
tween currently deductible expenses and capital
expenditures must begin with the Internal Revenue Code.
The IRC explains the distinctions between currently de-
ductible expenses, Section 162 of the IRC, and capital ex-
penditures, Section 263 of the IRC.26 Section 162 defines a
currently deductible expense27 as an "ordinary28 and neces-
23. FREELAND, supra note 3, at 338, citing First National Bank and Trust
Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1940).
24. The IRC is the major source of this law. Treasury Regulations help to
explain this law by providing specific examples. Revenue Rulings provide gui-
dance as to how the IRS is likely to view a particular matter. TAMs do not have
a binding effect, but do provide technical advice on a particular matter to a
particular taxpayer. See generally FREELAND, supra note 3.
25. See supra notes 4 and 9.
26. See I.R.C. § 162 (1994); I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
27. These expenses include:
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered; (2) traveling expenses (includ-
ing amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts
which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and (3) rent-
als or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business,
of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
28. An ordinary expense is one that is "commonly and frequently incurred"
in the taxpayer's line of business. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The
term "ordinary"
does not mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in the
sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. [For
example,] [a] lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen
7
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sary2 9 expense" incurred "in carrying on any trade or
business." 30
A capital expenditure, however, is not deductible. 31 As a
general rule, the IRC allows no deduction for the purchase of
new buildings, permanent improvements, or "betterments to
increase the value of any property or estate."32 This general
rule is inapplicable, however, to the situations provided in
IRC §§ 263(a)(1)(A)-(E), (G).33 In addition, the IRC does not
allow deductions for restoring property to its ordinary use for
once in a lifetime.... None the less, the expense is an ordinary one
because we know from experience that payments for such a pur-
pose, whether the amount is large or small, are the common and
accepted means of defense against attack.
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
29. A necessary expense is one that is "'appropriate and helpful for the de-
velopment of [the taxpayer's] business.'" Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503
U.S. 79, 85 (1992) (quoting Welch, 290 U.S. at 113). See also Commissioner v.
Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) cited in Russell W. Sullivan, The Deductibility
of Environmental Cleanup Expenditures, Annual Meeting, ABA Environmental
Taxes Committee, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 158-44, Doc. 94-7526.
30. Such an expense is one that is incurred "in pursuit of" or "in connection
with" a trade or business. Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511, 513-14 (1953).
The court in Frank held that:
The word 'pursuit' in the statutory phrase 'in pursuit of a trade or
business' is not used in the sense of 'searching for' or 'following af-
ter,' but in the sense of 'in connection with' or 'in the course of trade
or business.' It presupposes an existing trade or business with
which [the] petitioner is connected.
Id.
31. I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
32. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1994).
33. These situations include:
A) expenditures for the development of mines or deposits deducti-
ble under I.R.C. § 616;
B) research and experimental expenditures deductible under I.R.C.
§ 174;
C) soil and water conservation expenditures deductible under
I.R.C. § 175;
D) expenditures by farmers for fertilizer, etc., deductible under
I.R.C. § 180;
E) expenditures for removal of architectural and transportation
barriers to the handicapped and elderly which the taxpayer elects
to deduct under I.R.C. § 190;...
G) expenditures for which a deduction is allowed under I.R.C.
§ 179.
I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(A)-(E), (G) (1994).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
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which a deduction has previously been taken.34 Thus, under
the IRC, a capital expense, unlike a currently deductible ex-
pense, either increases the value or prolongs the life of the
asset. Therefore, the question is not whether the expense is
deductible, but rather when the expense is deductible,
thereby reflecting the matching principle. 35
The language of the IRC does not provide much guidance
in determining whether environmental cleanup costs are cur-
rently deductible or capitalized. The language merely pro-
vides that any given cost is currently deductible if it is
ordinary and necessary in carrying on a trade or business. 36
Furthermore, there is a presumption that costs are capital-
ized, unless grounds for current deductibility can be estab-
34. I.R.C. § 263(a)(2) (1994).
35. The "matching principle," (also referred to as the "matching concept")
an overriding principle in both accounting and taxation, seeks to match income
with its related expense, in order to accurately reflect a taxpayer's financial
position. LANNY G. CHASTEEN ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 51-52 (3d ed.
1989). Otherwise, income will not accurately reflect a taxpayer's financial posi-
tion. Consider, for example, that a taxpayer purchases new machinery to be
used in his business for $10,000 in a given year and that this machinery has a
useful life of 10 years. Consider also that the machinery can generate $100,000
in income per year, and thus, it is expected to generate $1,000,000 over its use-
ful life. If the taxpayer were to deduct the entire expense in the year that he
purchased the property, he would have $90,000 in income related to that ex-
pense. In the next nine years, he would have $100,000 in income per year.
Thus, there is a mismatching of income to expense over the ten year period.
To appropriately match income with its related expense in this case, the
taxpayer should deduct the $10,000 expenditure over a 10 year period (the use-
ful life of the asset). By doing so, the taxpayer will have income of $99,000
($100,000-[10,000/10]) per year relating to that expense, thereby matching in-
come and the related expense. If an expenditure is likely to create benefits be-
yond the year in which the expense was incurred, the matching principle
suggests that the expense must be capitalized and depreciated over the life of
the asset. If not, the expense must be fully deductible in the year in which it is
incurred.
Although it is clear that expenses should be matched with the related in-
come, it is not as clear when an expense can be currently deductible and when it
must be capitalized and depreciated over the useful life of the benefit provided.
Arguably, any given expenditure will have some future benefit, and thus,
should be capitalized. For example, if a taxpayer spends $1,000 to clean the
machinery that he purchased, this expense arguably adds value to the machin-
ery and prolongs its life by preventing the machinery from deteriorating.
36. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
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lished.3 7 Other than the language of IRC § 162 and the
presumption of capitalization, no specific authority exists re-
garding the treatment of environmental cleanup costs. Thus,
the taxpayer must look to Treasury Regulations, Revenue
Rulings, TAMs and case law for further guidance on this
matter.
B. The Treasury Regulations
Through the Treasury Regulations, the Treasury Depart-
ment has attempted to provide guidance for distinguishing
between a currently deductible and a capital expense by dis-
tinguishing between a repair38 and a replacement. Treasury
Regulation § 1.162-4 sets forth several repair criteria, which
specify that:
[T]he cost of incidental repairs which neither materially
add to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its
life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condi-
tion, may be deducted as an expense, provided the cost of
acquisition or production or the gain or loss basis of the
taxpayer's plant, equipment, or other property, as the case
may be, is not increased by the amount of such
expenditures. 39
The repair criteria established in Treasury Regulation
§ 1.162-4 "were illuminated and contrasted with capital ex-
penditures in Illinois Merchants Trust Company."40 In Illi-
nois Merchants Trust Co., the taxpayer owned a seven-story
brick building, which rested on a foundation of floating
wooden piles.41 Water levels lowered unexpectedly, causing
37. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
38. "A repair is not a permanent cure, but rather a means of dealing with
intermediate consequences." American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10
T.C. 361, 377 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1948), cited in Tech. Adv.
Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994).
40. United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968). At the time
of Illinois Merchants Trust Co., Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 was referred to
as Article 103 of Regulation 45. See Illinois Merchant Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. 103,
105-06 (1926).
41. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. at 104.
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REVENUE RULING 94-38
wooden piles to be exposed to the effects of air and other ele-
ments.42 As a result of the dry rot to the warehouse's river-
side wall, the entire building threatened to collapse.43 In or-
der to prevent the total loss and further damage to the build-
ing, the rotted piles were replaced with concrete supports
from the water level to the floor of the building.44 This work
not only required the removal of a vast portion of the ground
floor but also required the partially-collapsed wall to be
shored and raised up.45
Since the expense was incurred due to a sudden, unex-
pected condition and was necessary to keep the river-side
wall in a serviceable condition, which did not add value or
prolong the life of the property, the United States Board of
Tax Appeals characterized the expenditure as a repair.46 A
repair merely keeps the property in an operating condition
over its probable useful life for the uses for which it was ac-
quired,47 while "[r]epairs in the nature of replacements...
shall either be capitalized and depreciated in accordance with
section 16748 or charged against the depreciation reserve if
such an account is kept."49 By prolonging the life of the asset,
future income streams are added. Therefore, the matching
principle dictates capitalization.50
The Internal Revenue Code sets forth abstract principles
but, unlike Treasury Regulations, 51 Revenue Rulings and
TAMs, the IRC does not illustrate their application to specific
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 4 B.T.A. at 104.
46. Id. at 107.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994).
48. IRC § 167 states that a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for reason-
able "wear and tear," exhaustion, and obsolescence of the property's use in the
taxpayer's trade or business or the property's use to produce income. I.R.C.
§ 167 (1994).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994).
50. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
51. Treasury Regulations occasionally have examples which illustrate their
application. For example, Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 (expenses for educa-
tion) gives examples, while Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 (repairs) does not
give examples.
1995] 355
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factual cases. A taxpayer may find it easier to understand
whether the tax law applies to his set of facts when the tax
law is expressed in the form of a factual analysis. Clearly,
the IRS must issue either a Revenue Ruling or a TAM to ac-
complish this goal. However, since a TAM, unlike a Revenue
Ruling, applies only to a specific set of facts and a specific
taxpayer, a Revenue Ruling is more likely to clarify the law in
any given area.
C. Revenue Ruling 88-5752
Prior to Revenue Ruling 94-38, Revenue Ruling 88-57
was the most significant Revenue Ruling that dealt with dis-
tinctions between current deductions and capital expenses.
Although Revenue Ruling 88-57 did not directly involve envi-
ronmental cleanup costs, its three-pronged test provides a ba-
sis for determining how environmental cleanup costs might
be treated. 53
Under the facts of Revenue Ruling 88-57, the taxpayer,
who was involved in the railroad business, established a pro-
gram for major cyclical rehabilitation of freight cars. Under
this program, the taxpayer, a corporation, attempted to re-
store its freight-train cars to an efficient operating condition,
usually after eight to ten years of continuous use.54 The re-
habilitation was accomplished by essentially stripping a
freight car to its frame and then either reconditioning or re-
placing the structural components.55 Without rehabilitation,
the service life of a car would be only twelve to fourteen
years,56 while after rehabilitation, the freight car had an ad-
ditional useful life of twelve to fourteen years.57 With re-
peated rehabilitation, the cars can usually have a total
operating life in excess of thirty years. 58
52. Revenue Ruling 88-57 overruled Revenue Ruling 69-116, but was
modified by Revenue Ruling 94-38. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
53. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
58. Id.
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After applying the relevant statutory and case law to the
facts of Revenue Ruling 88-57, the IRS concluded that "cycli-
cal expenditures for major rehabilitations... are capital ex-
penditures under section 263(a) of the [Internal Revenue]
Code." 59 The law on which the IRS relied to determine if
property rehabilitation expenditures should be capitalized
can be stated in the form of three tests. 60 If any of these
three tests are satisfied, the expenditure must be capitalized
rather than classified as currently deductible. 61 Therefore,
capitalization is required if "(1) the expenditure appreciably
prolongs the useful life of the property; [or] (2) the expendi-
ture materially adds to the value of the property; or (3) the
expenditure is part of a general plan of rehabilitation, mod-
ernization, and improvement of the property."62
Under the facts of Revenue Ruling 88-57, the useful life
of the asset was increased, since after the rehabilitation ex-
penditures, the freight-train cars had a service life of an addi-
tional twelve to fourteen years, and could have an aggregate
service life of more than thirty years with repeated rehabili-
tations.63 In addition, by applying the logic set forth in
United States v. Wehrli,64 the IRS concluded that the major
rehabilitation program, which involved restoring the freight-
train cars to an efficient operating condition, qualified as a
plan requiring capitalization. 65 Furthermore, the IRS deter-
mined that the asset's prior value is the asset's value immedi-
ately before the expenditure rather than the asset's value
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 37 (citing United States v. Wehrli, 400
F.2d 686, 688 (10th Cir. 1968)). In Wehrli, the United States Court of Appeals
held that expenditures made pursuant to "a 'general plan' of rehabilitation,
modernization, and improvement of the property, must be capitalized, even
though, standing alone, the item may appropriately be classified as one of re-
pair." 400 F.2d at 689. In addition, the court found a general plan of improve-
ment because the facts and circumstances of the case, "including, but not
limited to, the purpose, nature, extent, and value of the work done," demon-
strated that there was a plan. 400 F.2d at 690.
65. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36, 37.
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before the condition necessitating the expenditure occurred,
except where there is a sudden decline in value.66 Therefore,
by applying the IRS's analysis from Revenue Ruling 88-57,
environmental cleanup costs are likely to be capitalized and
depreciated over the useful life of the benefit provided by the
expenditure, rather than classified as currently deductible.
D. Technical Advice Memorandums
Although Revenue Ruling 88-57 provided some guidance
as to the distinction between a currently deductible and a
capital expense, it did not specifically address environmental
cleanup costs. As a result, both IRS employees and taxpayers
were left with many questions, predominately whether and to
what extent Revenue Ruling 88-57 applied to environmental
cleanup costs.
The IRS issued several TAMs 67 in responding to specific
taxpayer situations. Although a taxpayer has access to these
TAMs, he should not expect the IRS to dictate similar treat-
ment in a similar situation.68 However, these TAMs provide
some indication as to how the IRS may treat a similar issue
in the future. Therefore, by examining these TAMs in con-
66. Id. By applying the approach suggested by the IRS, the value of the
property is likely to increase thereby resulting in capitalization. Consider, for
example, a piece of property that a taxpayer initially purchased for $1,000,000.
As a result of the taxpayer's pollution-emitting activities, the property is now
worth only $600,000. If a taxpayer incurred an expenditure to restore the prop-
erty to its prior condition, it would increase the property's value since there
would be fewer health risks involved and a lower risk that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) would impose sanctions under environmental protec-
tion statutes, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act. Thus, according to the definition of a capital expense
under IRC § 263, an environmental cleanup expense must be capitalized and
depreciated over the life of the benefit provided.
However, if the IRS applied the second approach, then it is unlikely that
the property's value would increase. This is because it is assumed that the ex-
penditure incurred will increase the property's value to its value prior to the
pollution or condition necessitating the expense.
67. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-
15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992); and Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993). In
issuing these TAMs, the IRS applied the distinctions between currently deduct-
ible expenses and capital expenses that were developed in both statutory and
case law.
68. FREELAND, supra note 3, at 26.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
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junction with Revenue Ruling 88-57 and other relevant tax
law, a taxpayer could determine whether and to what extent
environmental cleanup costs were currently deductible prior
to Revenue Ruling 94-38.
1. The Asbestos TAMs
One major environmental cleanup cost that taxpayers in-
cur relates to asbestos cleanup. 69 Generally, taxpayers incur
two types of asbestos cleanup costs: (1) costs incurred in re-
moving asbestos and replacing it with new insulation materi-
als and (2) costs incurred in encapsulating asbestos. TAMs
69. "In a typical assessment of... [asbestos abatement] costs, Stephen L.
Schweich, an environmental industry analyst with the Baltimore investment
bank Alex. Brown & Sons, estimates that government and commercial property
owners could spend a breathtaking $100 billion over the next 25 years to attack
asbestos." Louis S. Richman, Why Throw Money At Asbestos? Building Owners
And Taxpayers Could Spend $100 Billion Over The Next 25 Years To Scrape
The Stuff Out Of Buildings. But The Cleanup Might Cost More Lives Than It
Saves, FORTUNE, June 6, 1988, at 155. Mr. Richman points out that the costs of
removing asbestos will be staggering.
At an average of $25 a square foot, removing asbestos from a single
floor of a Manhattan office tower can run [as much as] $1 million. If
the removal contractors have to work near areas where building
occupants are present, the price can jump to twice or three times as
much.
Id. at 162. Purchasers of property containing asbestos will pay less money for
purchasing the property and, in effect, take over the asbestos abatement re-
sponsibilities. Id. at 166. "Mitsui Real Estate, the Japanese developer that
bought the Exxon building [in 1987], for example, knocked $90 million off the
asking price. Brokers estimate that the bill for cleaning up the 53-story tower
will run $50 million." Id.
Mr. Richman believes that current policies not only impose huge costs to
deal with these risks of asbestos, but also increase the risks for others. Louis S.
Richman, Why Throw Money At Asbestos? Building Owners And Taxpayers
Could Spend $100 Billion Over The Next 25 Years To Scrape The Stuff Out Of
Buildings. But The Cleanup Might Cost More Lives Than It Saves, FORTUNE,
June 6, 1988, at 155, 170. Mr. Richman advocates that the EPA and local au-
thorities set "standards for safe asbestos removal, and rigorously enforce [those]
standards." Id. at 170. He concludes by stating that since:
asbestos is omnipresent, holding building owners legally responsi-
ble for dubious health risks they had no part in creating makes lit-
tle sense. [He believes that] [t]he EPA and Congress could reduce
the confusion they have created by matching their regulatory zeal
to a hard-nosed appraisal of the problem and the burden on [the]
national treasure required to solve it.
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92-40-004 and 94-11-002 considered whether costs incurred
to remove and replace asbestos insulation could be currently
deductible, under IRC § 162, or whether these costs had to be
capitalized under IRC § 263.70 However, only TAM 94-11-
002 considered whether the costs to encapsulate asbestos-
containing materials were currently deductible or whether
these costs had to be capitalized and depreciated over the
useful life of the property.71
a. TAM 92-40-004-The First Asbestos TAM
The facts of TAM 92-40-004 indicate that prior to 1980,
certain equipment used in manufacturing a product was in-
sulated with asbestos-containing materials.72 However, as
the health risks posed by asbestos became better known, the
amount of airborne asbestos allowed in the workplace was re-
duced and the taxpayer was required to monitor the level of
airborne asbestos.73
The taxpayer responded to these state and federal re-
quirements and protected the health and safety of its employ-
ees by implementing an asbestos abatement program, under
which it removed the asbestos insulation from the equipment
entirely and replaced it with different insulating materials.
74
In the alternative, the taxpayer could have implemented a
program that involved "continuous monitoring and encapsu-
lation in the event that asbestos fibers became disturbed in
the course of ordinary repair or improvement in the vicin-
ity."75 Although the method selected was initially more ex-
pensive, the taxpayer believed that such a method would
ultimately be more cost-effective.7 6 In addition, although the
new insulation was less thermally-efficient than asbestos, the
taxpayer recognized that health and safety concerns were at
70. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993); Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-
004 (June 29, 1992).
71. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
72. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
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least as important as heating expenses. 77 "The taxpayer also
note[d] that the total cost of removal, although significant,
[was] minor in relation to the facilities overall repair and
maintenance costs and in relation to the assessed value of the
equipment for property tax purposes."78
After applying the law to these facts, the IRS concluded
that asbestos removal costs were to be treated as capital ex-
penditures. The IRS provided two reasons for this conclu-
sion. First, since deductions are the exception, rather than
the rule, the taxpayer had the burden of proving that the ex-
penses for removing and replacing asbestos were incidental
repairs and would not prolong the useful life of the asset.79
"Whether an expenditure increases [the] value or prolongs
the [useful] life of [the] property generally turns on the tax-
payer's particular facts and circumstances." 0
Second, the IRS rejected the taxpayer's position that the
Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner l test was appli-
cable for determining whether there was an increase in the
property's value for purposes of deductibility, and concluded
that this test was inapplicable under the facts of TAM 92-40-
004. In Plainfield-Union, the Tax Court held that for pur-
poses of determining whether there was an increase in prop-
erty value, the taxpayer must compare the property's value
after the expenditure with the property's value prior to the
condition necessitating the expenditure.8 2 "The taxpayer rea-
son[ed] that, if the Plainfield-Union test [was] applied to an
asset containing asbestos, then the value of the asset follow-
ing abatement must be compared with its value before asbes-
tos was known to be a health hazard."83 The taxpayer
claimed that there was no increase in property value because
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
81. 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
82. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (citing Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962)).
83. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
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the appraised value of its equipment was decreased by pre-
cisely the cost required to abate the asbestos.84
The IRS found the Plainfield-Union test inapplicable and
provided several reasons for this conclusion. First, the IRS
held that Plainfield-Union only applied "where [the] repairs
[were] necessary because the property ha[d] progressively de-
teriorated." 5 In Plainfield-Union, the taxpayer was forced to
replace the lining in its pipes with cement, after the original
lining had progressively deteriorated. 86 Under the facts of
TAM 92-40-004, however, the taxpayer removed asbestos be-
cause it posed a health hazard and was the most cost-effec-
tive way to comply with regulatory guidelines.8 7 Thus, the
fact pattern in TAM 92-40-004 was unlike that in Plainfield-
Union.
Another reason for the inapplicability of the Plainfield-
Union test was due to the impossibility of either valuing "the
asset prior to the existence of asbestos, or, using the Plain-
field- Union standard, prior to the condition necessitating the
expenditure." 88 Since there was no way of determining the
prior value of the property with which to compare the current
value, it could not be determined whether the property's
value increased.
An additional reason that the Plainfield-Union test was
inapplicable to the facts of TAM 92-40-004 is that the in-
crease in the property's value following asbestos abatement is
based on subjective factors" that are incompatible with the
objective measurement articulated in Plainfield-Union.90
The IRS held that "where asbestos levels are regulated by
state and federal authorities, asbestos removal significantly
reduces or eliminates the possibility that the taxpayer would
be forced to suspend operations because of excessive concen-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
88. Id.
89. For example, improved marketability or safer working conditions. Id.
90. Id. "Generally, property without asbestos is more attractive to potential
buyers, investors, and lenders. In fact, the lending policies of several financial
institutions favor, and sometimes require, asbestos removal." Id.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
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trations[,] [and thus,] the taxpayer's property is more valua-
ble because it can continuously operate within the regulatory
guidelines."91
Lastly, the IRS considered the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Indopco v. Commissioner,92 where:
the Supreme Court provided some guidance for distin-
guishing between deductions and capital expenditures.
The Court noted that, in determining whether an expendi-
ture is capital in nature, an important consideration is
whether the taxpayer realizes benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred. 93
Under the facts of TAM 92-40-004, the IRS found that the
asbestos removal costs created long-term future benefits,
such as a reduced liability risk for owners and investors and
safer working conditions, "that accrue beyond the year that
they were incurred."94 Thus, after concluding that the Plain-
field-Union test was inapplicable, that complying with regu-
latory provisions increased the property's value, and that
asbestos removal costs create long-term benefits, the IRS
treated asbestos removal costs as capital expenditures in
TAM 92-40-004.
b. TAM 94-11-002-The Second Asbestos TAM
Nearly two years after the IRS issued technical advice on
asbestos-related cleanups in TAM 92-40-004, the IRS issued
further technical advice in another asbestos-related case.
Under the facts of TAM 94-11-002, a taxpaying corporation
sought to sell rental space and related services.95 A few years
after the purchase of a particular facility, which contained a
warehouse and a boiler house, the taxpayer sought to expand
the facility.96 However, to secure a loan for this purpose, the
91. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
92. Indopco v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
93. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (citing Indopco, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 503 U.S. at 84-85).
94. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
95. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
96. Id.
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bank required the taxpayer to remove any materials that con-
tained asbestos from the facility and to "abate the problem of
exposed and damaged asbestos-containing pipe insulation."97
Not only did the bank require the taxpayer to remove all as-
bestos-containing materials from its boiler house, but, it also
required the taxpayer to abate the problem of exposed and
asbestos-containing pipe insulation within the warehouse.
With respect to the warehouse, the asbestos was encapsu-
lated, but with respect to the boiler house, the asbestos was
removed. After complying with these conditions, the tax-
payer deducted all of its costs of asbestos abatement under
IRC § 162.98
The IRS, however, concluded that only the costs incurred
to encapsulate the asbestos were currently deductible, while
the costs incurred to remove the asbestos and replace it with
other materials were capital expenditures. The IRS reasoned
that with respect to the asbestos removal costs, the facts of
TAM 94-11-002 were unlike the situation in Plainfield-
Union,99 where the Tax Court held that the "costs incurred
... to clean and replace the tar lining in a portion of its pipe-
line with a cement lining" did not increase the value of the
property when compared with the value of the property "prior
to the condition necessitating the expenditure." 100 Under the
facts of TAM 94-11-002, the IRS held that "the costs incurred
to remove asbestos increased the value, use, and capacity of
the taxpayer's property as compared to the status of its prop-
erty in its original asbestos-containing condition."1 1
The IRS reasoned that these expenditures not only per-
manently removed "the health risks posed by the presence of
asbestos in the boiler house,"10 2 but also increased the prop-
erty's attractiveness to investors, customers, etc. Further-
more, "the expenditures enhanced the usefulness and
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338, cited in Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002
(Nov. 19, 1993).
100. Id.
101. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
102. Id.
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capacity of the... property by enabling the taxpayer to pro-
vide office space and a garage in the space made available by
the elimination of the asbestos hazard."10 3 Thus, unlike the
costs in Plainfield- Union, the costs incurred for the removal
of asbestos contained in the boiler house "did not return the
property to the state that it was in before the condition neces-
sitating the expenditures arose."10 4
The IRS reasoned that under the facts of TAM 94-11-002,
the condition necessitating the expenditures arose when the
property was acquired. The IRS concluded that the costs in-
curred to remove the materials that contained asbestos were
capital expenditures because these expenditures added value
to the property and adapted the property to a new and differ-
ent use.10 5 This is essentially the same holding as in TAM
92-40-004.
The encapsulation of the asbestos, however, did not add
value to the property and did not adapt the property to a new
use; it merely kept the property in its normal operating con-
dition.106 The IRS relied upon the Tax Court's decision in
Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner where the Tax
Court held that:
[T]he addition of a concrete lining to walls in order to pre-
vent seepage of oil into the petitioner's basement was a de-
ductible repair expense. Specifically, the court concluded
that the expenditure did not add to the value or prolong
the useful life of the taxpayer's property over what it was
before the oil began to seep into its basement. Moreover,
the court found that the petitioner's plant did not operate
on a changed or larger scale, nor was it suitable for addi-
tional uses. The expenditure merely served to keep the
property in operating condition over its probable useful life
for the purpose that it was intended.,0 7
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
106. Id.
107. Id. See Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635, 641-
42 (1950), acq., 1950-2 C.B. 3.
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Similarly, in TAM 94-11-002, the encapsulation costs "did not
increase the value or prolong the useful life of the taxpayers
[sic] property beyond what it was before the asbestos became
damaged." 0 8 After also considering that the encapsulation
was merely a temporary remedy, the IRS concluded that the
costs of encapsulation satisfied the requirements of current
deductibility. Thus, under the asbestos TAMs, the costs of
encapsulation are currently deductible, while the costs of re-
moving the asbestos and replacing it with new insulation ma-
terial are capital expenses.
2. TAM 93-15-004-The Polychlorinated Biphenyl
(PCB) TAM 10 9
Another environmental problem taxpayers face is
remediating PCB-contaminated soil and groundwater. In
TAM 93-15-004, the IRS considered whether the costs to
cleanup PCBs should be treated as currently deductible ex-
penses or as capital expenditures. 110 Under the facts of this
TAM, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered
into an agreement with the taxpayer under which the tax-
payer agreed to determine which sites were contaminated by
PCBs in amounts that exceeded permissible levels. Environ-
mental audits were also required to ensure compliance with
this agreement. This TAM further states that:
[Under the cleanup program, during these tax years and
future years [the] taxpayer has incurred or anticipates in-
curring costs for the following: (1) soil contamination as-
108. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
109. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) belong to a group of synthetic organic
compounds consisting of between one and ten chlorine atoms which are then
attached to a biphenyl ring. PCBs are believed to be linked to skin disorders,
liver dysfunction, reproductive disorders, and tumor formation.
ENVIRONMENTAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 645 (William P. Cunningham et al. eds. 1st ed.
1994).
110. TAM 93-15-004 also considered whether a taxpayer's legal fees with re-
spect to claims made by the state and private third parties, and costs of litiga-
tion between a taxpayer and an insurance company, are currently deductible or
capital expenses. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992). This comment,
however, only addresses the actual environmental cleanup costs, and not the
legal fees associated with those costs.
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sessment, which involves testing to determine the level
and location of PCB contamination at station sites and
other sites; (2) groundwater contamination assessment; (3)
remediation ... ; (4) legal fees... ; (5) costs of oversight of
the cleanup operations; (6) costs of environmental audits
and [the] compliance manual required . . . ; and (7) re-
search and development expenses for chemical remedia-
tion processes that might facilitate the remediation of
PCBs.111
The IRS's analysis of the facts first involved determining
whether the cleanup activities constitute incidental repairs
within the meaning of Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4. In de-
termining this, "courts look to the nature of the work in rela-
tion to the taxpayer's operations, and not solely to the cost of
the work performed." 112 In addition, some courts have held
that where the work performed on tangible assets in relation
to the cost of the asset was costly, that work was a repair.113
The IRS concluded that "although the cost of the cleanup pro-
gram... [was] significant when compared to the taxpayer's
overall capital investment, this factor alone [was] not disposi-
tive of whether these amounts [were] deductible." 4
The IRC requires "an inquiry into the duration and ex-
tent of the benefits realized by the taxpayer."1 5 Courts have
considered this reasoning in distinguishing between cur-
rently deductible and capital expenses. 1 6 The IRS concluded
111. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
112. Id.
113. American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361 (1948), aff'd,
177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949), cited in Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17,
1992).
114. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 816 (10th
Cir. 1971); Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979). The
court in Mountain Fuel required the taxpayer to capitalize "the cost of digging
up, cutting, removing, hauling, straightening, cleaning, spotwelding corrosion
pits, removal of defective sections, beveling, bending, reopening trenches,
rewelding, relaying, testing and burying of all the old pipe returned to service."
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) (citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971)). In Wolfsen Land the court held
that "the costs of draglining ditches in an irrigation system on a farm to clear
them of sediment and other materials that blocked the flow of water in the
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that since the cleanup operations would benefit the rest of the
asset's useful life, the expenditure should be capitalized. 117
However, the IRS recognized that:
[T]here are some costs at issue that may not be attributa-
ble to the plan of rehabilitation, such as costs to assess
[the] contamination of property that does not undergo re-
habilitation as a result of the assessment. These costs may
be deducted if it is determined that an assessed site will
not undergo rehabilitation. 118
Under TAM 93-15-004, the IRS determined that the
Plainfield-Union increase in value test did not apply because
the repair in Plainfield-Union was only a minor part of the
taxpayer's business operations, while under the facts of TAM
93-15-004, the "cleanup program [was] a long-term system-
atic program that involve[d] systematically testing, assess-
ing, remediating, removing and replacing extensive amounts
of land."" 9 The IRS recognized that although an expense
may appear to be a repair, this expense will be considered a
capital expense, if, when taken in conjunction with other ex-
penses, the expense (cleanup costs) "will result in permanent
betterments to [the] taxpayer's properties."120
ditches" must be capitalized. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) (citing
Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979)). In addition, the
court held that characterizing environmental cleanup costs as a currently de-
ductible expense or as a capital expenditure depends upon "an analysis of the
work being performed, and not on whether [the] taxpayer was aware of the fu-
ture consequences of its disposal practices." Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec.
17, 1992).
117. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
118. Id.
119. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) (citing Plainfield-Union
Water Comp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962)).
120. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992). TAM 93-15-004 states that:
[Permanent] betterments include, but are not limited to, transform-
ing sections of contaminated land into land that is no longer con-
taminated, avoiding further government penalties by bringing the
properties into compliance with government regulations, providing
a safe environment for workers and adjoining property owners, and
increasing the marketability of the properties once the level of
PCBs is brought within the safety range permitted under the envi-
ronmental regulations.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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Therefore, TAM 93-15-004, similar to both TAMs 92-40-
004 and 94-11-002, recognized that removing hazardous
materials from a taxpayer's property will result in an overall
increase in value. Although these expenditures may appear
to be a repair, and thus, currently deductible, a taxpayer
must consider whether these expenditures are actually part
of an overall plan of improvement. If so, the costs must be
capitalized. By following these guidelines121 a taxpayer could
determine how the IRS would likely treat environmental
cleanup costs. However, the taxpaying public either did not
agree with the IRS's treatment of environmental clean-up
costs or found it to be ambiguous, as shown by the requests
for guidance that led to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 94-
38. Some of these concerns were addressed by Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38.122
III. Revenue Ruling 94-38: What Does It Say
and What Does It Accomplish?
The IRS, in Revenue Ruling 94-38, considered the treat-
ment of soil and groundwater remediation costs previously
addressed in TAM 93-15-004.123 However, Revenue Ruling
94-38 did not address asbestos cleanup costs, cleanup costs
related to pre-purchase pollution, or whether the Ruling was
limited to nondepreciable property. Thus, even after Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38, some concerns remain unaddressed. 124
121. These guidelines are the same as those set out in Revenue Ruling 88-57
and Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4. By applying these guidelines to most types
of environmental cleanup costs, the IRS will likely treat these environmental
cleanup costs as capital expenses. The TAMs, which followed Revenue Ruling
88-57, but preceded Revenue Ruling 94-38, confirmed this conclusion. See Rev.
Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. Although these TAMs do not have any binding ef-
fect, they do provide some indication as to how these environmental cleanup
costs probably will be treated. See generally FREELAND, supra note 3.
122. See infra section III.
123. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
124. But see infra note 197.
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A. The Facts Upon Which Revenue Ruling 94-38 Is Based
A taxpaying corporation built a manufacturing plant on
land that it purchased in 1970.125 Although the land was un-
contaminated by hazardous waste at the time of purchase,
the company's activities contaminated it.126 In order to com-
ply with local and federal environmental requirements, the
corporation remediated the soil and groundwater that had
been contaminated by hazardous waste, and decided to estab-
lish an appropriate system to safeguard the groundwater
through continued monitoring. 127
To implement these decisions, the corporation began to
excavate the contaminated soil, transport it to waste disposal
facilities, and use new soil to backfill the excavated areas.1
28
In addition, the corporation also constructed groundwater
treatment facilities to extract, treat, and monitor contami-
nated groundwater. 129 Although the construction of the
groundwater treatment facilities would require at least
twelve years to complete, the corporation would continue to
monitor the groundwater to ensure that the hazardous waste
had been removed in sufficient amounts to meet environmen-
tal requirements. 13 0 As a result of these activities, it was as-
sumed that the land would return to its condition prior to the
contamination, and the corporation would continue to use the
land in the same manner as before, with the exception that it
would "dispose of any hazardous waste in compliance with
environmental requirements."131
B. The Analysis Used by the IRS in Issuing Revenue
Ruling 94-38
In deciding whether the corporation's activities would be
treated as current deductions or capital expenses, the IRS
considered sections 162, 263, and 263A of the IRC and rele-
125. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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vant case law. Section 162 specifies that a taxpayer is al-
lowed "a deduction [for] all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business."132 Revenue Ruling 94-38 indicates
that even if a taxpayer incurs an expense only once in his
lifetime, the expense may be "ordinary and necessary if it is
appropriate and helpful in carrying on that business, is com-
monly and frequently incurred in the type of business con-
ducted by the taxpayer, and is not a capital expenditure." 133
Revenue Ruling 94-38 points out that the Supreme Court
in Welch v. Helvering134 and Deputy v. du Pont 3r recognized
that the "'decisive distinctions [between capital and ordinary
expenditures] are those of degree and not kind,' and a careful
examination of the particular facts of each case is re-
quired."1 36 For example, "it is important to consider the ex-
tent to which the expenditure will produce significant future
benefits."'137
The IRS concluded that the groundwater treatment facil-
ities constructed by the corporation had a useful life beyond
the year in which they were constructed. 38 In addition, since
the construction constituted "production" within the meaning
of IRC § 263A(g)(1), the corporation had to capitalize the di-
rect costs and an allocable share of indirect costs under IRC
§ 263A. Thus, the construction costs are capital expenditures
under IRC § 263 and Treasury Regulation § 1.263(a)-2(a). 139
However, the "soil remediation expenditures and ongoing
groundwater treatment expenditures (i.e., the groundwater
treatment expenditures other than the expenditures to con-
132. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994). See also Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. IRC
§ 263 prohibits deductions for capital expenditures. See I.R.C. § 263 (1994).
133. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 114 (1933)).
134. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
135. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
136. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, 36 (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. at 114). See also Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 86 (1992).
137. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 36; see Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503
U.S. 79, 85-86 (1992).
138. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, 36.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987).
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struct the groundwater treatment facilities) do not produce
permanent improvements to [the] land within the scope of
[IRCI § 263(a)(1) or otherwise provide significant future bene-
fits."140 Revenue Ruling 94-38 states that "the appropriate
test for determining whether the expenditures increase the
value of property is to compare the status of the asset after
the expenditure with the status of that asset before the condi-
tion arose that necessitated the expenditure (i.e., before the
land was contaminated by ... hazardous waste)."141
The IRS reasoned "soil remediation and ongoing ground-
water treatment expenditures do not result in improvements
that increase the value of [the taxpayer's] property because
[the taxpayer] has merely restored its soil and groundwater
to their approximate condition before they were contami-
nated by [the taxpayer's] manufacturing operations." 42 In
addition, "[tihese expenditures do not prolong the useful life
of the land, nor do they adapt the land to a new or different
use." 43 Thus, the IRS did not require the company to capi-
talize the expenditures under IRC § 263. Also, since the soil
remediation and groundwater treatment expenditures are
"appropriate and helpful in carrying on [the taxpayer's busi-
ness] and are commonly and frequently required in [the tax-
payer's] type of business," the IRS allowed current
deductibility of the expenditures.'"
By analyzing the distinctions between currently deducti-
ble expenses and capital expenses, and by examining how the
IRS has treated environmental cleanup costs and their rea-
sons for doing so, a taxpayer could determine that environ-
mental cleanup costs are likely to be treated as capital
expenses. However, in some individual cases, there may be
reason to allow current deductibility.145 Unfortunately, Rev-
enue Ruling 94-38 does not appear to provide clear guidance.
140. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35, 36.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 36. See also Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1992).
144. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 36.
145. An examination of the relevant case law reveals that current deductibil-
ity of environmental cleanup costs was appropriate in cases such as: (1) Illinois
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
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C. Effects of Revenue Ruling 94-38-What Did Revenue
Ruling 94-38 Accomplish?
Revenue Ruling 94-38 merely modifies Revenue Ruling
88-57 "to the extent [that Revenue Ruling 88-57] implies that
the value test applied by the court in Plainfield- Union Water
Co. v. Commissioner 46 cannot be an appropriate test in any
case other than the one in which there is sudden and unantic-
ipated damage to an asset."147 This has raised concerns
about the intended effects of Revenue Ruling 94-38. It is
clear that Revenue Ruling 94-38 addressed and virtually
overruled TAM 93-15-004. However, Revenue Ruling 94-38
is ambiguous on several issues. It is unclear whether it ap-
plied to the asbestos TAMs. In addition, some uncertainty
remains as to how to treat pre-purchase pollution costs, 148
Merchants Trust v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926), where "the cost of in-
serting concrete supports beneath the wooden piles was allowed as an ordinary
business deduction because the repairs were made to keep the property in effi-
cient operating condition and did not add to the value of the property," Susan
E. Anderson & Alison Dinkins, Environmental Cleanup Costs: Ordinary or
Capital Expenditure?, Tax Notes Today, July 13, 1994, available in LEXIS,
FEDTAX Library [hereinafter Anderson & Dinkins]; (2) Plainfield-Union Water
Co. v. Commissioner, where
a water company could receive a current deduction for changing the
lining of water pipes from tar to cement.... The court held that any
expenditure that returns property to the state it was in before the
situation prompting the expenditure arose is classified as a repair if
it does not make the property more valuable, useful, or longer-lived,
Anderson & Dinkins, supra, citing Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962); (3) Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14
T.C. 635 (1950), where "the Tax Court determined that these costs were repairs
since the expenditures neither enlarged the plant, nor increased the property's
value or life," Anderson & Dinkins, supra, citing Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950); and (4) American Bemberg Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 10 T.C. 361 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949), where the Tax
Court considered the purpose, physical nature, and effect of the work in sup-
porting a current deduction for the costs incurred. Anderson & Dinkins, supra,
citing American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361 (1948). This ex-
amination of the case law reveals that a current deduction is allowed, if the
expenditure does not extend the life of the property, or increase the value of the
property, or adapt the property for a different use. Anderson & Dinkins, supra.
146. 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
147. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 36.
148. See infra note 197.
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and whether Revenue Ruling 94-38 was limited to nondepre-
ciable property.
IV. An Analysis of Existing IRS Policy
In analyzing Revenue Ruling 94-38, it is important to
consider (1) whether the IRS's decision with respect to the
treatment of soil and groundwater remediation is justified;
(2) whether the decision is adequate to resolve concerns as to
the treatment of environmental cleanup costs; and (3) the
questions that Revenue Ruling 94-38 raises.
A. Is the IRS's Position on Soil and Groundwater
Remediation Correct?
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether
the position advocated by the IRS with respect to soil and
groundwater remediation is sound. In Revenue Ruling 94-38,
the IRS essentially adopted what the taxpayer advocated in
TAM 93-15-004, thereby negating TAM 93-15-004. By doing
so, the IRS adopted a more logical position than in TAM 93-
15-004, where its position was inconsistent with its own rea-
soning and discouraged the immediate implementation of en-
vironmental remediation projects. 149
In TAM 93-15-004, the IRS concluded that the PCB
cleanup costs were capital expenses because (1) the cleanup
involved "substantial modifications that constituted replace-
ments and betterments" and thus, were more than "inciden-
tal repairs," and (2) "the costs incurred benefitted the
taxpayer's entire operation over an extended period and in-
creased the value of the property." 150 The IRS reasoned that
the cleanup activities were not incidental repairs and that
the property value was increased as a result of the cleanup
149. J. Virgil Waggoner, Treasury's Position On Environmental Cleanup
Costs Is Flawed, Chemical Company Contends, Tax Notes Today, May 26,
1994, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 102-25, Doc. 94-5032. Mr.
Waggoner also suggested that the case law, the Treasury Regulations, and tax
accounting principles clearly establish that environmental cleanup costs, espe-
cially cleanup of PCB contamination, should be currently deductible. Id.
150. Waggoner, supra note 149 (citing Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17,
1992)).
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activities. It relied upon Wolfsen Land and Cattle Company
v. Commissioner,15 1 where the taxpayer was required to capi-
talize the costs of clearing sediment from irrigation ditches to
allow water to flow through the system.152 The IRS found
several similarities between the facts of Wolfsen and TAM 93-
15-004.153 First, in both cases, a program of waste identifica-
tion and disposal was only implemented after years of ongo-
ing operations. Second, in both TAM 93-15-004 and Wolfsen,
the IRS held that it was irrelevant when the repair was
made, concluding that whether a cleanup expense is classi-
fied as a repair depends on the work that is performed and
not the taxpayer's awareness "of the future consequences of
[its] disposal practices." 154 Third, the expenditures were
made as part of a systematic plan. Finally, the property
would be more valuable after the expenditure than before.
Since the facts in TAM 93-15-004 were similar to those in
Wolfsen, the IRS concluded that the expenditures would simi-
larly be capitalized.
The approach taken in TAM 93-15-004 is flawed for sev-
eral reasons. First, the IRS disregarded the results of the
Plainfield-Union test,155 which determined there was no in-
crease in the property's value or useful life. As previously
stated, unless the expenditure creates an increase in value or
useful life, it cannot be classified as a capital expense. Never-
theless, the IRS concluded that since the Plainfield-Union
test was not the sole factor to be considered, they were not
obligated to base their decision entirely upon it.156
Second, the IRS improperly classified the cleanup activ-
ity as part of a general plan of improvement. In concluding
that there was a plan, the IRS relied on Jones v. Commis-
151. 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
152. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. This test compared the value of the property immediately after the ex-
penditure to the value of the property before the condition that necessitated the
expenditure. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (citing Plainfleld-
Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962)).
156. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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sioner,15 7 where the taxpayer was required to make repairs to
his building, which consisted of repairing cracks, waterproof-
ing, replastering, plumbing, electrical work, etc. The district
court's position in Jones was that even though an activity,
such as painting, would ordinarily be classified as a repair, if
the activity is part of an overall plan of rehabilitation and
improvement of the property, then this activity must be capi-
talized. Perhaps the court's reasoning was based upon the
concept of judicial economy. It may be impractical to deter-
mine what constitutes a repair or improvement, when all are
part of an overall plan of rehabilitation and improvement.
The activity involved in Jones went beyond the mere soil and
groundwater remediation involved in TAM 93-15-004. Thus,
the soil and groundwater remediation was not part of a gen-
eral plan of improvement and should not have been classified
as a capital expense.
The IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 94-38 provided an
incentive which encouraged immediate implementation of
similar remediation projects. It accomplished this by provid-
ing for the current deductibility of the groundwater treat-
ment facility monitoring costs, as well as the cost of soil and
groundwater remediation.158 The costs of building the facil-
ity, however, would have to be capitalized.
Unlike TAM 93-15-004, the position in Revenue Ruling
94-38 was sound, because it primarily relied on the Plain-
field- Union test. The IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 94-38
rejected the notion that the soil and groundwater remedia-
tion, while similar in nature to that in TAM 93-15-004, was
part of an overall plan of rehabilitation and improvement. 5 9
However, the IRS's reasoning is susceptable to attack.
Throughout the Revenue Ruling, the IRS states conclusions
without providing adequate reasoning. For example, the IRS
concluded, without any discussion, that the expense in Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38 did not adapt the property to a new or dif-
ferent use. This position contradicted TAM 93-15-004, where
157. 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
158. See Waggoner, supra note 149 and accompanying text.
159. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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the IRS concluded that a similar expense did adapt the prop-
erty to a new and different use. In TAM 93-15-004, unlike
Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS reasoned that removing con-
taminated soil and replacing it with uncontaminated soil re-
sulted in the creation of a new capital asset (land). Thus, it is
apparent that in Revenue Ruling 94-38 the IRS flatly rejects
its position in TAM 93-15-004.
B. Is Revenue Ruling 94-38 Sufficient'to Resolve Concerns
as to the Treatment of Environmental Cleanup
Costs?
The IRS's decision in Revenue Ruling 94-38 provides in-
adequate guidance to taxpayers, thereby raising concerns re-
garding the extent of its applicability. Although, arguably,
Revenue Ruling 94-38 is limited to its facts and should not be
applied beyond that scope, the questions it raises regarding
the treatment of environmental cleanup costs cannot be re-
solved by merely concluding that it is inapplicable.
Conceivably, the rationale of Revenue Ruling 94-38 could
apply to these questions, especially the treatment of asbestos
abatement costs. 160 Although the IRS may conclude that
Revenue Ruling 94-38 is "fact-specific," 161 the IRS must still
160. See infra section lV(C)(2). One commentator has argued that the IRS
extend Revenue Ruling 94-38 to other environmental remediation costs, such as
asbestos abatement, "as quickly as is administratively feasible." Steven A.
Wechsler, National Realty Committee Urges Expansion of Revenue Ruling 94-
38, Tax Notes Today, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 94
TNT 192-49; see also Evan Slavitt, Tax Implications Of Environmental Ex-
penses, Tax Notes Today, July 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library,
94 TNT 141-62. Mr. Slavitt argues that the term "asbestos removal" can be
substituted for the term "soil remediation" "without doing any violence either to
the factual premise or the logic of the revenue ruling. Accordingly, the Revenue
Ruling must be interpreted as overruling the two prior TAMs. While this out-
come may not have been intended, it will be hard for the IRS to justify any
distinction." See Slavitt, supra.
161. Merrill Feldstein, the author of Revenue Ruling 94-38, has indicated
that Revenue Ruling 94-38 "is limited to its facts and applies only to costs asso-
ciated with land remediation when the taxpayer caused the damage. The rul-
ing does not apply to asbestos abatement, removal of storage tanks, cleanup of
preacquisition contamination, or costs incurred in cleaning up property prior to
selling it." Marlis L. Carson, Environmental Cleanup Ruling has Narrow Im-
pact, Says IRS's Feldstein, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS,
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set forth their position in a Revenue Ruling that addresses
questions left unanswered by Revenue Ruling 94-38. For ex-
ample, with respect to asbestos abatement costs, one possible
course of action would be to suspend TAMs 92-40-004 and 94-
11-002 and conduct an administrative review to find a re-
placement for these TAMs. 162 Another possible option would
be to extend Revenue Ruling 94-38 to other environmental
remediation costs, such as asbestos abatement "as quickly as
is administratively feasible." 163
Although both approaches may lead to the same result,
the first approach advocates an administrative review prior
to issuing any further guidance. Under this approach, there
is no guarantee that Revenue Ruling 94-38 would apply to
asbestos cases, while the second approach advocates the ex-
tension of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to such areas. Until some
action is taken by the IRS, questions raised by Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38 will continue to pose uncertainty.
C. What Questions Does Revenue Ruling 94-38 Raise?
The IRS's decision in Revenue Ruling 94-38 focused on
whether costs attributable to soil and groundwater remedia-
FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 155-6. Ms. Feldstein also pointed out that the IRS
"is taking a 'wait and see' approach to issuing more guidance, choosing to 'see
what Rev. RUl. 94-38 prompts.'" Id. Ms. Feldstein "stressed that the applica-
tion of the revenue ruling is dependent on a facts and circumstances approach,
and she would not speculate as to how it would apply to situations differing
from the facts in the ruling." Id. Finally, Ms. Feldstein stated that although
she was unsure whether Revenue Ruling 94-38 "would apply to the cleanup of a
combination of preacquisition and post-acquisition contamination," she felt that
the answer "depends upon the breadth of the application of Plainfield Union."
Id. However, since this statement was made during the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association's Environmental Taxes Committee, in New Orleans
on August 6, 1994, it provides no binding authority which can be relied upon.
162. See Wechsler, supra note 160 and accompanying text.
163. Wechsler, supra note 160. Steven A. Wechsler is President of the Na-
tional Realty Committee. Jody J. Brewster, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel (in-
come tax and accounting) recently stated at a Real Estate Taxes Subcommittee
meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA) Tax Section that the IRS is
considering issuing a Revenue Ruling that would extend the treatment of Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38 to asbestos abatement costs. Amy S. Cohen, IRS May Issue
Ruling On Treatment Of Asbestos Removal Costs, Says Brewster, Tax Notes To-
day, Feb. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 95 TNT 23-8.
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tion of nondepreciable property after its purchase were cur-
rently deductible. However, it is unclear whether the
Revenue Ruling can be applied to (1) depreciable property, (2)
asbestos abatement costs, and (3) pre-purchase pollution
cleanup costs.1 64 By failing to specifically address these is-
sues, the IRS has created uncertainty for taxpayers.
1. Depreciable Property
Revenue Ruling 94-38 specifically points out that the
property involved was nondepreciable.165 However, since the
IRS does not specifically state whether the Revenue Ruling is
limited to nondepreciable property, it raises the question as
to whether the result would be different in the case of depre-
ciable property. If the situation were to arise, the IRS would
most likely argue that Revenue Ruling 94-38 was limited to
cases involving nondepreciable property. Furthermore, the
IRS might argue that IRC § 263(a)(2) specifies that property
subject to an allowance for depreciation, amortization, or de-
pletion must be capitalized. 166
However, this argument fails because there is no indica-
tion that Congress or the IRS intended for a distinction be-
tween a repair and a capital expense to be inapplicable to IRC
§ 263(a)(2). This distinction between a repair and a capital
expense is addressed in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 which
indicates that a repair is that:
which neither materially add[s] to the value of the prop-
erty nor appreciably prolongs its life, but keep[s] it in an
ordinarily efficient operating condition .... [However,] re-
pairs in the nature of replacements, to the extent that they
arrest deterioration and appreciably prolong the life of the
property, shall either be capitalized and depreciated in ac-
cordance with section 167 or charged against the deprecia-
tion reserve, if such an account is kept. 167
164. But see infra note 197.
165. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
166. I.R.C. § 263(a)(2) (1994). The IRS relies on this provision in Revenue
Ruling 94-38.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994).
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There is no indication that this test is not applicable to cases
of depreciable property. Congress could have set forth this
distinction in the statute, or the distinction could have been
presented in the regulations. However, no such distinction
was made in the IRC or in the language of Treasury Regula-
tions § 1.162-4 and § 1.263(a)-2(b). Therefore, the IRS would
have no logical basis for such a distinction.
The language of Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 clearly
indicates that a repair in the nature of a replacement can be
charged against the depreciation reserve. To have a depreci-
ation reserve, the asset must be depreciable. Therefore, the
test in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 must be considered in
determining the deductibility of any given expense.
IRC § 263(a)(2) specifies that a deduction is not allowed
for amounts expended to restore property for which an allow-
ance, such as depreciation has already been made. 168 It may
be inferred that IRC § 263(a)(2)'s language contemplates the
test adopted in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4. Further sup-
port for this position is found in Treasury Regulation
§ 1.263(a)-l(b). This Treasury Regulation indicates that the
amounts referred to in IRC § 263(a)(1) and (a)(2) "include
amounts paid or incurred to add to the value, or substantially
prolong the useful life, of the property owned by the taxpayer
... or to adapt the property to a new or different use."169 The
language of Treasury Regulation § 1.263(a)-1(b) clearly indi-
cates that the test to determine whether an expense is a re-
pair or replacement must still be applied. The test for
capitalization set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4
must be satisfied, because IRC § 263(a)(2) is insufficient, by
itself, to deny current deductibility to a repair for restoring a
depreciable asset.
The case law supports this position. In Midland Empire
Packing v. Commissioner,170 the Tax Court allowed a current
deduction for depreciable property. The taxpayer in Midland
Empire built a concrete wall to protect its property from fur-
168. I.R.C. § 263(a)(2) (1994).
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (1994).
170. 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
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ther damage caused by oil. The Tax Court reasoned that
since this expenditure did not prolong the expected life .of the
property over what it would have been before the event that
necessitated the repair, and since this repair did not add
value to the property, this expense was currently deducti-
ble. 171 This indicates that the repair or replacement test set
forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-4 was applied.
The IRS's reasoning in Revenue Ruling 94-38 could con-
ceivably be applied to asbestos remediation costs. 172 Since
asbestos is a depreciable asset, it can be concluded that Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38 also applies to depreciable property. Thus,
it is sufficient to consider the nature of the expense (that is,
does it add value to the property, increase its useful life, etc.)
to determine whether Revenue Ruling 94-38 applies.
Since the IRS has not specifically stated whether Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38 applies to depreciable property, this ques-
tion remains unanswered and their response is uncertain.
However, there is no indication that the distinction between a
repair and a capital expense is inapplicable to depreciable as-
sets. Courts and the IRS 173 have allowed current deductions
in the case of depreciable property. Therefore, the fact that
property is depreciable should not limit the applicability of
Revenue Ruling 94-38.
2. Asbestos Abatement Costs
The IRS's current position with respect to the tax treat-
ment of asbestos abatement costs is unclear. Revenue Ruling
94-38 does not specifically address this issue. However, the
IRS has addressed this issue in TAMs 92-40-004 and 94-11-
002.174 These TAMs, however, are inconsistent with the rea-
soning in Revenue Ruling 94-38.175
171. Midland Empire Packing v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 642.
172. Wechsler, supra note 160.
173. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992) (encapsulation of asbes-
tos is currently deductible).
174. See supra notes 72-108 and accompanying text for discussion of the
treatment of asbestos abatement costs under TAMs 92-40-004 and 94-11-002.
175. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text for the IRS's reasoning
in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
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First, TAM 92-40-004 held that the costs incurred to re-
move asbestos and to replace it with other insulation in-
creased the value of the property because it removed the
health and safety risks that existed.176 This TAM applied the
Plainfield-Union test to determine whether there was an in-
crease in the value of the asset.177 The IRS concluded that
the Plainfield-Union test was inapplicable to determine
whether asbestos removal costs increase property value.178
Thus, this TAM requires capitalization of these asbestos
abatement costs.
TAM 94-11-002, however, represents the IRS's most re-
cent position on the tax treatment of asbestos abatement
costs. In TAM 94-11-002, the IRS held that the costs of re-
moving and replacing asbestos with other insulating materi-
als were capital expenditures, while costs for encapsulating
the asbestos and the continual monitoring of this encapsula-
tion were currently deductible. 179
The issue, therefore, is whether asbestos removal costs
are currently deductible. Although the IRS agrees with the
taxpayer that encapsulation is currently deductible, this posi-
tion must still be justified. The IRS should address the issues
of asbestos removal and abatement costs in a Revenue Ruling
allowing a current deduction for both the costs of asbestos en-
capsulation and asbestos removal.
The costs of asbestos encapsulation should be currently
deductible. This is because these costs "neither appreciably
increase the value of the taxpayer's property nor substan-
tially prolong its useful life,"' 80 thereby indicating that the
effects of the encapsulation are merely temporary. In other
words, encapsulation deals with intermediate consequences.
Thus, the requirements for capitalization have not been satis-
fied with respect to encapsulation.
176. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
177. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (citing Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962)).
178. Id.
179. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993).
180. Id.
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
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These requirements have also not been satisfied with re-
spect to asbestos removal. Nevertheless, the IRS has taken a
different position which requires capitalization of asbestos re-
moval costs. This view cannot be justified in light of the IRS's
reasoning in TAM 94-11-002 and Revenue Ruling 94-38 and
thus should not be reflected in the Revenue Ruling that ad-
dresses asbestos abatement costs.
There are several reasons justifying why the IRS should
allow current deductibility of asbestos removal costs. 181
First, the soil and groundwater remediation process is simi-
lar to the process of asbestos removal and replacement. In
Revenue Ruling 94-38, the taxpayer had to excavate the con-
taminated soil, transport this soil to waste disposal facilities,
and replace it with uncontaminated soil.182 This process, for
which current deductibility is allowed, is similar to removing
asbestos and replacing it with new insulating materials, be-
cause both processes involve removal of contaminated mate-
rial and replacement with new material.
181. However, there is a possible argument against this position. This argu-
ment is based on the Tax Court's holding in Boddie v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M.
(CCH) 350 (1961). In Boddie, the Tax Court held that the costs incurred to re-
pair a heating system by replacing it with a new heating system were capital
expenses. Id. at 352. The taxpayer contended that since the heating system
was part of the house and since the house was depreciated as a whole, the re-
placement of the heating system was a repair of the house. Id. However, the
Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, relying upon IRC § 263(a)(2) in
reaching their decision. Id.
If one accepts the Tax Court's position, it is apparent that removal and
replacement of asbestos could not be deducted. This is because Boddie suggests
that removal and replacement of a depreciable asset is not deductible because
the repair of the furnace involved installing a new furnace. The replacement of
the furnace was not considered a repair of the house. Essentially, the furnace
was viewed as a separate depreciable asset by the court, rather than part of a
larger asset. 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 352.
This situation, however, is unlike that in the case of asbestos. Although
asbestos is a depreciable asset, it is normally considered to be part of the overall
asset. Thus, unless the asset, such as machinery, has a greater value, a greater
useful life, or is adapted to a new use, the removal of asbestos and replacement
with new insulation materials is currently deductible. Therefore, it is clear that
an argument against the current deductibility of asbestos removal based on the
Boddie case is without merit.
182. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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Second, the distinction between asbestos removal and as-
bestos encapsulation and monitoring is unclear.183 The IRS
bases its distinctions on three grounds: (1) the elimination of
health risks; (2) attractiveness of property to potential pur-
chasers; and (3) whether the effect of the expense was more
than temporary. As discussed below, consideration of these
three grounds reveals that the distinction between asbestos
removal and encapsulation is tenuous, at best. Therefore,
both asbestos removal and encapsulation merit current
deductibility.
The IRS's first ground for distinction was its reliance
upon the fact that asbestos "removal costs added value [to the
taxpayer's property] by eliminating the health risks associ-
ated with asbestos."184 However, the encapsulation costs,
which also reduced the health risks, were currently deducti-
ble.18 5 Thus, "the elimination or reduction of health risks is
not a very cogent indicator for when a cost must be
capitalized."1 86
The IRS also relied upon the fact that asbestos removal
makes property more attractive to prospective buyers,
thereby adding value to the property. 87 However, this will
not only apply to asbestos removal, but also to encapsulation
and any other type of repair, since all repairs make the prop-
erty more attractive to potential purchasers. 8 8 Thus, the
fact that an expense results in a more attractive-looking
property, does not necessarily make the expense capital in
nature. 89
Furthermore, the IRS relied upon the fact that asbestos
removal resulted in more than a temporary effect. That is, it
"cured more than the 'intermediate consequences' of the as-
183. See Lester Droller, IRS Continues Flawed Analysis of Treatment of En-
vironmental Cleanup Costs: TAM 94-11-002, Tax Notes Today, May 6, 1994,
available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 88-41.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
188. Droller, supra note 183.
189. Id.
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bestos problem."190 However, the effects of the encapsulation
costs were temporary. These expenses did not completely
eliminate the asbestos from the site, but rather served only
as a remedial measure. 191 "The taxpayer will have to contin-
uously monitor asbestos levels and re-encapsulate or remove
insulation if the materials become worn or damaged."192
Thus, TAM 94-11-002 essentially holds that an asbestos
abatement expense can be currently deductible, if it has a
temporary effect. "[T]his position, [however] ignores the case
law,' 93 as well as the common understanding of the term
'repair.' "194
Asbestos removal did not create a new asset, but merely
kept the original asset in a pollution-free condition. How-
ever, even if the asbestos removal did adapt the property to a
new use, the case law relied upon by the IRS did not support
its decision.' 95 Nonetheless, given its position in Revenue
Ruling 94-38, the IRS has opened the door to allowing similar
types of deductions for removal of contaminated material and
replacement with uncontaminated material. Although this
may not have been the intention of the IRS, the IRS has
placed itself in the position of having to allow such deductions
if it wishes to remain consistent with its position in Revenue
Ruling 94-38.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Droller, supra note 183.
193. See Illinois Merchants Trust, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926), cited in Droller, supra
note 183. Mr. Droller argues that:
There is not the slightest inference in Illinois Merchants Trust that
the offending condition (the rotted piles) was only temporarily
cured. Rather, unlike in American Bemberg, it is clear that the tax-
payer in Illinois Merchants Trust did cure the very source of its
problem (the rotted piles underlying its property). Thus, based on
Illinois Merchants Trust alone, the TAM's assertion that a repair 'is
not a permanent cure' is demonstrably wrong. A repair may be
temporary (as in Plainfield Union) or it may be permanent.
Id. (citations omitted).
194. Droller, supra note 183.
195. See Droller, supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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3. Pre-Purchase Pollution Cleanup Costs
The IRS's position with respect to whether Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38 applies to pre-purchase pollution costs is also un-
clear. 196 In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS points out that it
was dealing with a taxpayer that sought to remediate its
property, which contained no pollution at the time of
purchase. This, of course, raises the question of whether Rev-
enue Ruling 94-38 is limited to cases where there is no pre-
purchase pollution. The IRS, however, does not answer that
question, thereby creating more uncertainty for the
taxpayer. 197
To alleviate this uncertainty, the IRS must issue a Reve-
nue Ruling that addresses this issue. Upon analysis of this
issue, the IRS's position in this Revenue Ruling must be that
in cases where the taxpayer was aware of the pre-purchase
pollution, the remediation expense must be capitalized. How-
ever, if the taxpayer was not aware of the pre-purchase pollu-
196. See infra note 197.
197. However, in TAM 95-41-005, the IRS set forth a position with respect to
the treatment of pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-
41-005 (September 27, 1995). Although a TAM is not necessarily binding on the
IRS with respect to all taxpayers, this TAM demonstrates where the IRS's posi-
tion is heading. Under the facts of TAM 95-41-005, the taxpayer obtained prop-
erty in an uncontaminated condition and used the property as farmland, until
the property became contaminated, due to its disposal of agricultural chemical
waste products. The taxpayer then transferred this property to the County.
The County intended to use this property for a recreational center. However,
due to the hazardous waste contamination, the County transferred the property
back to the taxpayer for $1. The taxpayer conducted testing to determine the
extent of the environmental damage. The taxpayer sought to deduct these ex-
penses as well as expenses incurred for consulting and engineering services as
an ordinary and necessary business expense under IRC § 162. The taxpayer
sought to rely on Revenue Ruling 94-38, which provided that costs incurred for
soil and groundwater remediation are currently deductible. Id.
The IRS, however, reasoned in TAM 95-41-005 that Revenue Ruling 94-38
was inapplicable to a situation involving pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs.
The IRS based this decision on the test in Plainfield-Union, claiming that this
test only sought to restore property to its uncontaminated condition at the time
it was acquired by the taxpayer. Thus, based on the IRS's reasoning, the pre-
purchase pollution cleanup costs (those relating to the determination of the ex-
tent of environmental damage) must be capitalized and Revenue Ruling 94-38
does not apply. Although the facts of this TAM do not explicitly deal with actual
remediation expenses, there is an indication that the IRS will also apply this
decision to that factual situation. Id. But see note 207.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/12
REVENUE RULING 94-38
tion, then the remediation expense must be currently
deductible. Thus, the applicability of Revenue Ruling 94-38
will depend on the taxpayer's awareness of the existence of
pre-purchase pollution at the time of purchase. This makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to apply the Plainfield-Union test
as it was applied in Revenue Ruling 94-38 because the value
of the property immediately before the contamination cannot
be determined.
In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS concluded that since
the groundwater treatment facility constructed by the corpo-
ration had a useful life beyond the year in which it was con-
structed, the costs incurred to construct this groundwater
treatment facility had to be capitalized. 198 However, the IRS
recognized that ongoing groundwater treatment expenses
could be currently deducted. 199 Thus, the IRS appropriately
considered the matching principle in reaching its decision in
Revenue Ruling 94-38.200
The fact pattern analyzed in Revenue Ruling 94-38 only
considered a situation in which there was no pollution on the
property prior to purchase. It did not consider a situation in
which the taxpayer sought to remediate a condition existing
on the property at the time of purchase. 201 By alluding to
this issue, but failing to respond to it, the IRS has created an
uncertainty which must be resolved with an additional Reve-
nue Ruling. This Revenue Ruling must provide that in deter-
mining whether pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs are
currently deductible, the IRS must consider whether the tax-
payer had knowledge of the existing pollution at the time he
purchased the property. If the taxpayer had such knowledge,
the costs of cleaning up the pollution must be capitalized.
However, if the taxpayer did not have such knowledge, then
these cleanup costs can be currently deductible.
198. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
199. Id.
200. However, the matching principle was not the only factor that was con-
sidered by the IRS in reaching its decision. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
201. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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This position is supported by both the Tax Court's deci-
sion in De Cou v. Commissioner20 2 and Treasury Regulation
§ 1.165-3.203 This case demonstrates that in determining
whether or not a loss caused by a latent defect is currently
deductible, the taxpayer must not have been aware of the de-
fect at the time of purchase. 20 4 The Treasury Regulations
demonstrate that, in determining whether expenses incurred
in demolition of a building (thereby resulting in a loss) are
deductible under IRC § 165, depends on the taxpayer's intent
at the time that he purchased the property. If the taxpayer
intended to demolish the building, then he is not entitled to a
current deduction. On the contrary, if the need to demolish
the building results from some sudden and unexpected
change in events, the taxpayer is entitled to a current deduc-
tion. Thus, the Tax Court focuses on the taxpayer's knowl-
202. 103 T.C. 80 (1994). In De Cou, the taxpayer purchased, developed, and
leased residential and commercial property. Id. at 80-81. After consulting an
architect the taxpayer decided to renovate some of his properties and subse-
quently leased them to several businesses. Id. at 81. The taxpayer also negoti-
ated the purchase of additional properties that adjoined the already purchased
properties. Prior to the purchase of this property, the taxpayer inspected the
property to determine the possibilities for potential renovation and incorpora-
tion into the other properties. Id.
An initial inspection revealed nothing that would prevent this incorpora-
tion. De Cou v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. at 81. In addition, the inspection did
not reveal any structural defects in the property. However, hidden structural
defects were found at the time of renovation. These hidden defects were so sub-
stantial that one of the buildings had to be demolished and removed. Id.
In reaching their decision to allow a current deduction for the loss sus-
tained, the Tax Court focused on the unexpectedness of discovering the defects.
Id. at 87-88. The Tax Court's rationale in De Cou essentially supports the posi-
tion that discovering a defect in property, independent of actual deterioration,
can result in a decrease in the property's value sufficient enough to justify cur-
rent deductibility. LAURIE L. MALMAN, ET AL., PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERI-
ALS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 12 (Teacher's Update 1995) (on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review).
203. If "in the course of a trade or business .. . real property is purchased
with the intention of demolishing either immediately or subsequently the build-
ings situated thereon: No deduction shall be allowed under section 165(a)."
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). However, a loss "arising
from a demolition of old buildings shall be allowed as a deduction under section
165(a) if the demolition occurs as a result of a plan formed subsequent to the
acquisition of the buildings." Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis
added).
204. 103 T.C. 80 (1994).
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edge at the time of purchase and the IRC uses the intent of
the taxpayer at the time of purchase to determine whether
costs of demolition resulting in a loss are currently
deductible.
This reasoning, as well as the reasoning in De Cou, can
also be used to determine whether pre-purchase pollution
cleanup costs are currently deductible. If the taxpayer
purchases property and is aware that the property contains
pollution, which requires cleanup, he should not be entitled to
a current deduction. This is because he purchased the prop-
erty knowing that he would have to incur costs of cleanup
(that is, with the intent to cleanup the property). Under such
circumstances, it is likely that the taxpayer paid less for the
property than he would have paid if he was unaware of the
pollution.20 5 A current deduction in such a case would result
in an unfair advantage over a purchaser who paid full value
for the property, and then had to incur the costs of cleanup.
Consider, for example, that there are two purchasers, A
and B. Each purchases an identical piece of property worth
$1,000,000. Consider also, that both pieces of property con-
tain pollution that will cost $100,000 to remediate. Since A
was aware of the pollution on the property, he demanded a
lower purchase price and paid only $900,000 for the property.
However, B was unaware of this pollution and paid
$1,000,000 for the property. Now, consider that both A and B
incurred a cost of $100,000 to remove the pollution from the
property. By doing so, A's total cost of the property would be
$1,000,000 (the $900,000 purchase price plus the $100,000
cleanup cost) while B's total cost would be $1,100,000 (the
$1,000,000 purchase price plus the $100,000 cleanup cost).
To allow a current deduction under these circumstances
would result in only $800,000 ($900,000 less $100,000) that
would have to be capitalized, while allowing B a current de-
duction would result in $1,000,000 ($1,100,000 less $100,000)
205. This assumes that sellers will seek the actual fair market value of their
property and not consider reducing its value for the required remediation un-
less the taxpayer brings it to their attention. However, if the seller does con-
sider the needed remediation in setting the price, it is assumed that he will
inform the purchaser of this.
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that would have to be capitalized. Clearly, these results are
unjust, providing favorable treatment to one who was aware
of the pollution at the time of purchase and did not pay full
value.
To achieve an equitable result, only a taxpayer who
purchases property while he is unaware of the existing pollu-
tion should be entitled to a current deduction. Under these
facts, requiring A to capitalize the $100,000 cleanup expense
will result in the capitalization of $1,000,000 ($900,000
purchase price plus $100,000 cleanup expense). Further-
more, allowing B a current deduction will result in the capi-
talization of $1,000,000 ($1,000,000 purchase price plus
$100,000 cleanup costs less $100,000 deduction). Thus, both
A and B would capitalize $1,000,000 if the taxpayer's knowl-
edge of existing pollution at the time of purchase is used as
the determining factor for whether pre-purchase pollution
cleanup costs are currently deductible.
Not only does this approach create an equitable result,
but it is also consistent with the matching principle and the
Plainfield-Union test. This approach is consistent with the
matching principle because it considers whether the expense
incurred will benefit future income periods.206 The approach
is also consistent with the Plainfield-Union test because it
provides a basis for comparing the value of the property after
the cleanup expenses are incurred.
206. In a letter from McGee Grigsby of Latham & Watkins to Stuart L.
Brown, the Associate Chief Counsel for the IRS, Mr. Grigsby advocates that the
"matching principle" be used to avoid a distortion of actual income. McGee Grig-
sby, Commentator Analyzes Tax Treatment Environmental Cleanup Costs, Tax
Notes Today, Oct. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 93 TNT 206-
50, Doc. 93-10258.
Mr. Grigsby's view was supported by Bob Kilinskis of the Treasury's Office
of Tax Legislative Counsel. This was evident at a panel discussion sponsored
by the Federal Bar Association Tax Section, where Mr. Kilinskis stated that
"[Mr. Grigsby] believes that the matching concept should be the basis for fur-
ther guidance or legislation on environmental cleanup because it is the under-
pinning of the code sections involved." Barbara Kirchheimer, 'Matching
Concept' Should Provide Framework For Tax Treatment of Environmental
Cleanup, Says Treasury Official, Tax Notes Today, Jan. 12, 1994, available in
LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, 94 TNT 8-3.
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To apply the matching principle, it must first be deter-
mined whether the expense incurred impacts past,20 7 cur-
rent, or future income periods. If the expense affects either
past or current income periods, the expense is currently de-
ductible. If the expense affects future income periods then
the expense must be capitalized.
The matching principle works well when the expense re-
lates to the taxpayer's income-producing activities. However,
in the case of pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs, the
cleanup expense relates to the prior owner's (the seller's) in-
come-producing activities. Therefore, the ordinary use of the
matching principle is inapplicable in the case of pre-purchase
pollution cleanup costs.
Nevertheless, the theory underlying the matching princi-
ple can be used to resolve concerns surrounding the treat-
ment of pre-purchase pollution costs. By using the approach
demonstrated above, it is clear that the matching principle
applies. This is because the approach allows for distinctions
between expenses that impact current or past income-produc-
ing periods and future income-producing periods.
The following example illustrates that the approach ad-
vocated above is consistent with the matching principle. Con-
sider, once again, the fact pattern discussed above. In this
207. There are many examples of income that precede the expenditure. Grig-
sby, supra note 206. A common example is compensation. Id. Current compen-
sation is usually based on past performance. Id.
Often, several years of past performance are awarded on a single
occasion. Although the IRS once argued that allowing a current de-
duction for compensation related to several years of past perform-
ance would not dearly reflect income in the year of the deduction,
the Supreme Court put that issue to rest long ago in Lucas v. Ox
Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930).
Grigsby, supra note 206.
Other examples include legal expenses and litigation settlement payments.
Grigsby, supra note 205. "The current deductibility of such expenditures is
well-established." Id. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), allowed a
taxpayer to currently deduct "expenses incurred in defending charges of past
criminal conduct." Grigsby, supra note 205. These examples demonstrate that
"when the expenditure relates to previously earned income, the expenditure is
currently deductible .... To conclude otherwise would distort and not clearly
reflect income by further separating the income from the associated expendi-
tures." Grigsby, supra note 205.
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example, the $100,000 cleanup costs are currently deductible
when the taxpayer was unaware of the existence of pollution.
These costs are currently deductible under the matching
principle because the costs relate back to past income-produc-
ing activities. That is, they relate back to the date of
purchase. In addition, the costs were incurred to restore the
property to what its value should have been had the taxpayer
paid the actual value of the property (which considered the
pollution). Under the facts of this example, the value of the
property with pollution was $900,000. The taxpayer paid
$1,000,000 for the property and $100,000 to cleanup the prop-
erty. As a result of the cleanup, the property is worth
$1,000,000. Thus, since the expense incurred merely re-
stored the property to its current value without impacting fu-
ture income periods, the cleanup costs must be currently
deductible.
However, if the taxpayer was aware of the pollution at
the time of purchase, then it is assumed that he paid a lower
price for the property (the property's value without the pollu-
tion LESS the cost to cleanup the pollution). In this case, the
purchase price would have been $900,000 ($1,000,000 less
$100,000). If costs are incurred to remove the pollution, these
costs no longer relate to prior or current income-producing ac-
tivities because the taxpayer actually paid what the property
was worth at the time he purchased it. He did not pay more
for the property in the way that the purchaser in the prior
example did. Thus, his cleanup expense of $100,000 would
increase the value of the property and provide him with fu-
ture benefit. Therefore, under the matching principle, the ex-
pense must be capitalized.
It is apparent through the two examples illustrating the
use of the matching principle that the approach advocated
above is consistent with the underlying theory of the match-
ing principle. This is because the effect of the expense on
past, current, and future income-producing periods is
considered.
The approach discussed above is also consistent with the
Plainfield-Union test. To apply the Plainfield-Union test, the
value of the property after the cleanup expense is incurred
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must be compared with the value of the property prior to the
condition necessitating the expenditure. This poses difficulty
in cases where the condition causing the need for the cleanup
expense was not caused by the taxpayer but by a prior owner
(the seller) of the property. Thus, there was no basis for com-
parison because it was difficult, if not impossible to determine
the value of the property when it was in the seller's hands.
However, by using the date of purchase as a date for com-
parison, it can be determined whether there was actually an
increase in property value caused by the purchase. The basis
for using the date of purchase as the date of comparison in
the case of pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs is that on the
date of purchase the pollution is factored into the purchase
price.
Consider, once again, that the taxpayer was aware of the
existence of pollution on the date of purchase. As a result, he
paid $900,000 for the property rather than $1,000,000. Once
the $100,000 is expended to remove the pollution, the prop-
erty is worth $1,000,000 (the value it would have been, if
there was no pollution). Under these facts, Plainfield- Union
would dictate a capitalization, because the expense incurred
increased the value of the property prior to pollution from
$900,000 to $1,000,000.
However, also consider that if the taxpayer was unaware
of the pollution at the time of purchase, he would have likely
paid $1,000,000 for the property (the value of the property, if
there was no pollution). In such a case, if the taxpayer ex-
pends $100,000 to remove the pollution, it must be currently
deductible because there was no increase in the property's
value as a result of the cleanup expense. That is, the value of
the property immediately after the expenditure ($1,000,000)
was equal to what it was before the condition necessitating
the expenditure ($1,000,000). Thus, current deductibility is
authorized.
The use of the purchase price, rather than the value of
the property prior to the contamination, as a means for deter-
mining whether there was an increase in property value, is a
proper substitute in applying the Plainfield-Union test. This
is because the taxpayer's awareness of the existence of pollu-
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tion is the condition that necessitated the expenditure. If the
taxpayer knew of the existence of pollution, he would have
paid a lower price for the property, thereby eliminating the
need for a current deduction. However, if the taxpayer was
unaware of the existence of pollution, he would not have paid
less for the property. Thus, any expenditure to cleanup the
property would only restore the property's value to what it
would have been if no pollution actually existed, thereby cre-
ating the need for a current deduction. Therefore, it is appar-
ent that the approach advocated above is consistent with the
Plainfield- Union test.
Based on the above analysis, it is apparent that the
treatment of pre-pollution cleanup costs depends upon the
taxpayer's awareness of the existence of the pollution at the
time of purchase. 208 Such an approach is appropriate in view
of the Tax Court's decision in De Cou.20 9 It is also apparent
208. The approach advocated in TAM 95-41-005 is consistent with that advo-
cated above because there is a clear indication that the taxpayer (buyer) knew
of the existing contamination at the time that the County transferred the prop-
erty back to it. This is because the purchase price is relatively low ($1) and the
taxpayer was the one who actually contaminated the property to begin with.
Thus, since under the approach mentioned above, knowledge of the existence of
contamination will determine whether the cleanup expense is currently deduct-
ible, the fact that such knowledge existed here will mean that it is non-deducti-
ble and must be capitalized, according to the approach set forth above.
Although the IRS did not refer to the actual costs of remediation in this
TAM, the IRS's reasoning would lead one to believe that this decision is gener-
ally applicable to all pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs. Based on the reason-
ing above, such an approach would be wrong. That is, it would be inconsistent
with what the De Cou case and the Treasury Regulation appear to advocate as a
rule. Thus, although the actual conclusion in this TAM is consistent with such
an approach, the fact that the IRS apparently adopts a "hard and fast rule"
demonstrates the IRS's approach in the case where the subsequent purchaser
had no knowledge of the contamination at the time of purchase.
However, it is also possible to conclude that the taxpayer was always the
owner of the property. That is, he acquired it in an uncontaminated condition
and polluted the property. The property was then transferred to another and
then back to the taxpayer. Ignoring the intermediate transfer, it could be held
that the taxpayer was always the owner of property. Prior to publication of this
article, the IRS has taken this position in a currently unnumbered TAM,
thereby reversing their position in TAM 95-41-005. Therefore, the applicability
of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to pre-pollution cleanup costs still remains unad-
dressed. See supra note 197.
209. 103 T.C. 80 (1994).
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that asbestos removal costs are currently deductible accord-
ing to the IRS's reasoning in Revenue Ruling 94-38. Further-
more, it is apparent that Revenue Ruling 94-38 is not limited
to nondepreciable property in light of the courts' and the
IRS's allowance of current deductions in the case of deprecia-
ble property and in light of the fact that there is no indication
that Congress or the IRS intended to limit the distinction be-
tween repairs and capital expenses to IRC § 263(a)(1). The
IRS must consider these issues and state the positions advo-
cated above in a Revenue Ruling. Unless the IRS takes some
action, uncertainty will continue to linger.
V. Conclusion
Revenue Ruling 94-38 may be a step towards resolving
the controversy regarding the tax treatment of environmen-
tal cleanup costs. However, it has yet to be determined to
what extent this Revenue Ruling applies. An examination of
the facts and reasoning inherent in Revenue Ruling 94-38
reveals that its factual circumstances are limited in nature.
Given the need for guidance in the area of environmental
remediation, either Revenue Ruling 94-38 must be expanded
or further guidance must be given with respect to other types
of environmental remediation costs, including asbestos
abatement.
Revenue Ruling 94-38 appears to resolve the concerns
that existed prior to its issuance by addressing the proper tax
treatment of certain environmental cleanup costs. The fact
that this Revenue Ruling specifically involved post-purchase
soil and groundwater remediation may cause a taxpayer to
question whether it is limited to those types of environmental
cleanup costs. Merrill D. Feldstein, author of Revenue Rul-
ing 94-38, issued a statement at the August 6, 1994 meeting
of the Environmental Tax Committee of the American Bar
Association, indicating that Revenue Ruling 94-38 is re-
stricted to its facts.210 This leaves the taxpayer in the same
position that he was in prior to Revenue Ruling 94-38 with
respect to asbestos cleanup costs and cleanup costs relating
210. See supra note 161.
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to pre-purchase pollution. In addition, since Revenue Ruling
94-38 specifically dealt with soil (a nondepreciable asset), the
taxpayer is left wondering whether the IRS would apply its
reasoning in Revenue Ruling 94-38 to depreciable assets.
The IRS must issue another Revenue Ruling that ad-
dresses these concerns. Based upon the existing law, it is
clear that this Revenue Ruling must state that: (1) the rea-
soning of Revenue Ruling 94-38 also applies to depreciable
assets; (2) asbestos removal costs and asbestos encapsulation
costs are currently deductible; and (3) the treatment of pre-
purchase pollution cleanup costs depends upon the taxpayer's
knowledge of the existence of the pollution at the time of
purchase.
The circumstances that led to the issuance of Revenue
Ruling 94-38 have yet to be fully resolved. In considering the
three TAMs that preceded Revenue Ruling 94-38, only the
facts of TAM 93-15-004 appear to be addressed. It is uncer-
tain whether Revenue Ruling 94-38 would also apply to the
facts of TAMs 92-40-004 and 94-11-002. Although some am-
biguity was resolved, other uncertainty remains and will con-
tinue to linger until the IRS takes definitive steps to clarify
these situations. The IRS must establish and express its
views on the tax treatment of environmental remediation
costs.
In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS was trying to clarify
its position in an area of law filled with ambiguity. However,
the IRS has added to this confusion by raising new questions.
The IRS may have intentionally left these questions unan-
swered by trying to take a cautious step-by-step approach to
provide guidance. In addition, the IRS has left itself some
leeway to deal with a potential situation that it wished to dis-
tinguish in the future. However, by issuing the limited gui-
dance that it did, the IRS has created the need for the
expansion of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to other types of environ-
mental cleanup costs, such as asbestos.
Now, the IRS is in the position of having to extend Reve-
nue Ruling 94-38 further and sooner than it anticipated. The
position taken in Revenue Ruling 94-38 is sound. Any future
Revenue Ruling must remain consistent with Revenue Rul-
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ing 94-38, and its reasoning must extend to depreciative as-
sets, asbestos remediation and encapsulation, and the
treatment of pre-purchase pollution cleanup costs when there
is no knowledge of the existing pollution at the time of
purchase. Failure to take any action will most likely result in
taxpayers taking it upon themselves to decide whether they
are entitled to a deduction. Since most taxpayers are likely to
decide the issue in their own favor, it will be up to the IRS to
discover the noncompliance. This will increase audit work
and litigation expenses, as taxpayers seek to defend their po-
sition in the midst of the IRS's uncertainty. In order to avoid
this, the IRS must provide further guidance and attempt once
again to clarify its position in a muddled area of the law.
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